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Abstract 
 
Direct elections to the European Parliament have been held since 1979 and turnout has 
steadily decreased with each election. The turnout rates vary considerably between member 
states, but the overall trend is diminishing participation from the citizens of Europe. It is well 
established that politically interested citizens vote in larger numbers, but what can influence 
the not so politically interested to actually turn out to vote? The aim of this thesis is to study if 
exposure to more information about the European Union (EU) and the European Parliament 
can make politically uninterested citizens more likely to vote in the European elections, and to 
compare different sources of information. The hypotheses are tested using logistic regression 
and data from the European Election Survey 2014. The results show that uninterested 
individuals who gained more information in the last weeks before the election were more 
likely to vote, even when controlling for several common determinants for turnout. The study 
also comes to the conclusion that the information source that has the strongest effect on 
turnout is personal conversations, which indicates that citizens are more influenced by what 
their friends and family members say than by what they see on television or read in the 
newspapers.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In the beginning of the European integration project it was foremost an interngovernmental 
organisation based on indirect representation. It was generally presumed that the majority of 
citizens viewed the then European Community as a good thing, and they had no direct 
representation in the organisation. The European Parliament consisted of members from 
national parliaments and was just an advisory institution which had no real influence over 
decision making. But in an effort to make citizens feel closer to the union and engage more in 
European politics the European Parliament was reformed and is since 1979 the only European 
Union (EU) institution that is directly elected. It was also an action meant to increase the 
democratic legitimacy of the organisation (Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010, p.5). The European 
Parliament has successively gained more powers through several treaty changes, and now has 
greater influence over the legislative process and the appointment of the European 
Commission. Nowadays the ordinary legislative procedure, where the European Parliament 
has equal powers as the Council of ministers, is used in the absolute majority of legislation 
issues.  
The next given question is of course if these reforms have succeeded in their goal of making 
EU citizens more enthusiastic about the European Union. It appears as though this is not the 
case. The average turnout in all member states in the first elections to the European 
Parliament was 62% and it has steadily decreased in each of the 7 elections since then. Most 
recently in 2014 it only amounted to 42,6%, and in every member state turnout in the 
European Parliament elections is much lower than in national general elections (European 
Parliament, 2014). But why is this the case and what factors influence citizens’ probability to 
turn out and vote? Many scholars have tried to identify the determinants of turnout in the 
European elections. This study will contribute to the existing literature by bringing in a focus 
on politically uninterested citizens and the effect of information exposure on turnout. Some 
work has already been published concerning information factors, but what is new here is the 
inclusion of the more recent EU member states and the comparison of different information 
sources in the European Parliament context. 
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1.1 The role of information – a prerequisite for voting 
 
An extensive amount of research has been dedicated to explaining why the citizens of the EU 
do not turn out to vote on European election day. One of the most well established theories is 
the second order election model, which predicted that turnout to the European Parliament 
elections would be low because the issues in EU politics do not matter as much to voters as 
national political issues (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Some scholars have found that certain 
individual traits affect the probability to vote, such as age, income, education, political interest 
and Eurosceptic attitudes (Clark, 2014; Bhatti & Hansen, 2012; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016; 
Söderlund, Wass & Blais, 2011). Others have pointed to structural and contextual 
explanations, like electoral laws, party systems and the timing of the European election in 
relation to national elections (Flickinger & Studlar, 2007; Wessels & Franklin, 2009; Marsh & 
Mikhaylov, 2010). But the thesis at hand will focus on informational aspects.  
There are indications that a lot of voters simply do not have enough knowledge and 
information about the EU and its institutions to be comfortable to vote (Clark, 2014, p.345). 
EU citizens get most of their information about the EU through different media outlets such as 
TV, newspapers and radio, which makes it important to study how visible the EU is in the 
flow of news and how it is portrayed (Schuck, Xesonakis, Elenbaas, Banducci & de Vreese, 
2010; Nardis, 2015). This may differ substantially between member states. Another probable 
source of information is conversations with friends and family who know more about the 
subject, and who might in turn have gained this knowledge from the media. But there is an 
important distinction to make here which concerns the information available in relation to 
citizens’ level of political interest and their propensity to assimilate said information.  
Individuals who have a personal interest in politics will probably actively search for election 
information themselves, but politically uninterested citizens are not likely to make the same 
effort and instead rely on the information that is given to them. Turnout rates hint at the 
consequences of this; research has shown that politically uninterested citizens are less likely 
to turn out to vote and that this tendency is even stronger in European elections than in 
national elections (Söderlund et al, 2011). But some still think that they have enough 
information to make a choice and feel confident enough to vote. It is therefore important to 
study if more information about the election can make politically uninterested citizens decide 
to cast their vote in the European Parliament elections, and if some sources of information are 
more influential than others in this regard. There are some scholars that examine the media 
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and news coverage in relation to European elections; the amount of EU news and differences 
between media outlets and countries (de Vreese, Semetko, Banducci & Boomgaarden, 2006; 
Schuck et al, 2010). But few connect this directly to turnout rates and even fewer consider the 
additional information source that is personal conversation. In today’s increasingly connected 
world the importance of media and the Internet can hardly be overstated, but it is interesting 
to include interpersonal conversations in the discussion and analyse their continued relevance 
in a society where a large share of both private communication and public debate take place 
online.  
In 2004 ten new member states joined the EU in the biggest enlargement so far and they have 
since been joined by three more1. All of the first ten countries voted to join with clear 
majorities in separate national referenda during 2003 with relatively high turnout. The 2004 
election to the European Parliament was held shortly after the accession but many were 
surprised by the low turnout rates in many of the new member states (Fauvelle-Aymar & 
Stegmaier, 2008). In the two subsequent European Parliament elections they have continued 
to account for some of the lowest turnout rates in Europe, especially the countries with a 
history of communist regime. Research on voting behaviour has since showed that the second 
order model does not fit as well in the new as in the old member states (Marsh & Mikhaylov, 
2010), and several studies indicate that the determinants of turnout may be different in these 
countries (Flickinger & Studlar, 2007; Wessels & Franklin, 2009). The reason for why some 
theories about voting behaviour do not apply to the eastern member states is still to be 
determined. But what is apparent is that since these variations can greatly affect the results, 
variables should be tested separately in an eastern and western context. Otherwise important 
results may be either underrated or exaggerated, when applied to the EU as a whole. Of 
course the division is not clear cut, there is also diversity within each block. But the averages 
are still far enough apart to motivate the categorization. Additionally, the information 
exposure factors of interest in this study have not previously been explored in the more recent 
EU member states.  
 
                                                          
1 EU accessions:   
2004: Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta. 
2007: Romania, Bulgaria.  
2013: Croatia.  
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1.2 Purpose and disposition 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether exposure to more information about the 
European Parliament elections can increase the possibility that an individual with low 
political interest goes to cast a vote. Different sources of information - such as television, 
newspapers, the Internet and personal conversations - will be compared to see if some are 
more effective than others in this regard. There will also be a specific focus on possible 
differences between the established western member states and the post-communist Central- 
and East European states that have gained EU membership since 2004. 
The thesis continues with an overview of the existing literature on determinants of turnout in 
the European Parliament elections. This will lead to a few precise hypotheses being presented, 
which will then be tested empirically with data from the 2014 European Election Survey. The 
study then concludes with an analysis of the results and a discussion on how to move forward.  
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2. Theory and earlier research  
 
During the almost 40 years that have passed since the first European Parliament election an 
extensive amount of research has been devoted to the determinants of both turnout and other 
aspects of the elections. The union has gone through many changes during this time, such as 
treaty changes and several rounds of enlargements. In 1979 the EU consisted of 9 member 
states and in 2014 it encompassed 28, and the European Parliament has gained more powers 
in decision making. The second order election model is the most prominent one in this field of 
research, and it will be included in this chapter because it is still relevant today. Apart from 
that the aim is to mostly review studies from the last three European elections, since one of 
the points of interest is the difference between old and new member states. This makes studies 
published since the 2004 enlargement the most relevant to include.  
 
2.1 The second order election model 
 
Reif and Schmitt (1980) presented this model after the very first European Parliament 
election, but it has been tested and developed by many subsequent authors and is still 
discussed today (Hix & Marsh, 2011). They originally put forward the theory that national 
general elections are first order elections and all other elections are second order elections. 
This includes local elections, referenda and European Parliament elections. What these second 
order elections have in common is that they are usually concerned with issues of lesser 
salience to citizens. Key issues that concern citizens’ everyday life (like healthcare, education, 
law and order, pensions and taxation) are still primarily governed at the national level. Also, 
the outcome of the European Parliament elections does not lead to government formation, 
rendering the consequences of the election less impactful. Because less is at stake in the 
second order elections many citizens do not care enough about them to go to the poll, and 
turnout is therefore lower than in first order elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). The campaigns 
also tend to concern domestic rather than European issues and some scholars argue that the 
citizens who do vote only take national issues into account when voting, either unable to 
separate the national level from the EU level governance in this multi-layered governmental 
system or using the European elections strategically to affect the main national political arena 
(Reif & Schmitt, 1980).  
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However, more recent research questions this assumption. For example, Clark (2014, p.342) 
points out that the prominent debates surrounding several referenda in different countries 
during the last years indicate an engagement with EU issues. Clark & Rohrschneider (2009) 
could show that citizens do care about EU issues and evaluate the EU separately from national 
institutions. They find support for both the hypothesis that citizens “transfer” opinions and 
attitudes about national institutions onto the EU and the opposite hypothesis that citizens 
evaluate the EU independently of national institutions. They use individual-level data, and 
argue that aggregate studies are biased towards the transfer hypothesis at the expense of the 
EU evaluation hypothesis. It seems that the behaviour to transfer opinions is stronger in the 
context of the European Parliament elections than at other times, and the authors’ explanation 
for that is the structure of the elections. National parties play a pivotal role in European 
elections, which naturally gives more attention to national issues during the campaign and 
makes it harder for voters to separate opinions about party performance on the national and 
the EU level (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009, p.658-660). It might be that one reason turnout is 
low, despite citizens caring about EU issues, is that they think European elections do not 
matter. The outcome of a referendum is obvious and has significant consequences, therefor 
generating higher turnout rates. But when it comes to European Parliament elections many 
citizens do not see any connection between their vote and the outcome of the election and 
perceive the political system as ineffective (Schmitt & van der Eijk, 2007, p.146). They do not 
think that it matters which parties win or lose, rendering the elections rather pointless in their 
opinion (Wessels & Franklin, 2009). 
Reif & Schmitt’s prediction of low turnout has proven to be correct; in all member states the 
turnout in European Parliament elections is lower than in national elections. But there is more 
to the explanation for this than only the theory of low salience to citizens. There is quite some 
debate among scholars regarding the causes for the depressed turnout patterns, as will become 
apparent in the following sections. 
 
2.2 Contextual factors  
 
Information 
Most of the research on information and voting behaviour concerns party choice and issue 
salience rather than turnout. For example Hobolt & Wittrock (2011) show that citizens are 
more likely to take EU issues into consideration when choosing a party after being given more 
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information about party positions on the EU integration dimension. In light of their results it 
is not unreasonable to assume that information could also increase citizens’ will to go vote at 
all, since they gain more knowledge and can make an informed choice. A few studies have 
examined the direct effect of information on turnout, which seem to support this.  
Hogh & Vinaes Larsen (2016) describe some difficulties with measuring the effect of 
information, which might explain why there is limited research on the subject. In any given 
study it is hard to empirically separate information from other factors that might influence 
voters’ propensity to gather more information themselves, such as education. Furthermore, 
choosing higher education might in turn be dependent on socio-demographic factors (Hogh & 
Vinaes Larsen, 2016, pp.1496 & 1498). To circumvent this and single out the information 
variable, they conduct an experiment involving a homogenous group of eligible Danish high 
school students. Some of the students had to participate in a mandatory one-day workshop on 
the EU just before the 2014 European Parliament elections, while the rest did not. Afterwards 
the ones who received the extra information about the EU were more likely to report vote 
intention in the upcoming European election. The students were about the same age and with 
similar backgrounds, and even when controlling for the minor socio-demographic differences 
at hand the effect of information remained unchanged, so the authors can argue with 
confidence that the effect shown is indeed because of information (Hogh & Vinaes Larsen, 
2016).  
The above cited study examined a small sample and a rather unusual information source 
(workshop), so more research is needed to confirm their results. Information about the EU and 
the European Parliament elections can be gained in many different ways. A person might 
watch news programs on television, read an article in a newspaper, listen to a politician at a 
meeting, read party programs on the internet, stumble across news in their flows on social 
media or have a conversation with a more knowledgeable friend or family member. Very little 
research has focused on comparing these sources of information to discover if some have a 
greater influence on voting behaviour and turnout than others.  
One of few articles to have a closer look at this is by Schönbach & Lauf (2002) who examine 
if a so called “trap effect” exists for television media. The theory assumes that television 
would be the most effective media outlet to capture and influence politically uninterested 
citizens. But in the end they find no support for this, and watching more television does not 
seem to increase the propensity to vote. But they do find that having personal conversations 
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about the elections with friends and family has a significant effect on turnout for the 
politically uninterested. Schönbach & Lauf (2002) argue that it is probably their more 
politically interested friends who initiate these conversations but that they can have a 
substantial impact by persuading their friends to vote. The authors point out that it is also 
harder to avoid a conversation with another person than for example just changing the channel 
on television or skipping a page in the newspaper. De Vreese & Boomgaarden (2006) also 
find that interpersonal communication boosts turnout in their study of news coverage in 
Denmark & the Netherlands. They point to previous research concerning voting behaviour in 
other contexts than European elections which suggests that personal conversations are closely 
connected to political participation (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006, p.333). This confirms 
that apart from media outlets, personal conversations are a central source of information for 
many citizens, and should be included in studies of information.  
However, the study by Schönbach & Lauf uses data from the 1999 European Parliament 
elections and it is hard to know if their results are still valid. The European Union looked very 
different in 1999 compared to 2014. The European Parliament has much greater powers today 
and their role in the EU has changed significantly. There has also been an almost 
revolutionary change in media environment during the last 15 years. In 1999 social media did 
not exist, the Internet was still relatively new and not at all such a natural information source 
in people’s everyday lives. Most people were limited to watching a few public and 
commercial broadcast television channels and reading mainstream press publications. The 
possibility to personally customise your own news and media consumption that is now taken 
for granted was very limited in 1999. Also, the post-communist states had not yet joined the 
EU so Schönbach & Lauf’s (2002) analysis is based on only 12 western European countries. 
But no similar studies have been published since then, so a new take on the role of 
information and media for politically uninterested citizens is much needed in the modern 
context of 2014. This study hopes to contribute to this gap in the literature.  
News coverage and media  
The media, especially news sources, have a unique possibility to have an impact on how 
citizens form their opinions and attitudes towards the EU and its institutions. Many voters get 
most of their information about the European Parliament and the elections through different 
media outlets, such as TV, newspapers, radio and the Internet. This gives media actors the 
power to portray some issues as more important than others and to frame the EU in different 
contexts (de Vreese et al 2006; Schuck et al, 2011). During a national election campaign the 
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reporting is massive in most countries and every political candidate is under close scrutiny. 
This means that even voters who are not particularly interested in politics will probably pick 
up some information about the election and party positions on important issues. But in the 
weeks before a European election fewer news sources publish content on the election, and if 
they do it usually concerns domestic rather than European issues. The candidates to the 
European Parliament are not at all as visible to citizens as the parties’ candidates to the 
national parliament (de Vreese et al, 2006).  
According to Anderson & McLeod (2004) this might not be the fault of the media, but instead 
a consequence of the European Parliaments poor skills in communication. They found that the 
press and information directorate of the European Parliament and their several national and 
regional offices lacked appropriate funding and were understaffed (Anderson & McLeod, 
2004). But despite this the amount of EU news does seem to be increasing with time. Media 
studies from three consecutive elections (1999, 2004, 2009) analysing the news coverage 
during a few weeks before the elections show that the visibility has increased from each 
election to the next. For example, the amount of EU news on television was twice as large in 
2009 compared to 2004 as it went from 9,8,% to 20,15% (de Vreese et al, 2006; Schuck et al, 
2011). There is unfortunately no similar study from 2014, but it is still possible to see a trend 
of increasing coverage during the 2000s.  
However, the increase is not even across the EU member states or across media outlets. Since 
there is no developed European public sphere it is up to national media to report on EU issues, 
which renders the media environment very different in member states (de Vreese et al, 2006; 
Schuck et al, 2011). Both studies from 2004 and 2009 also find that there is generally more 
news about the EU in newspapers than on television, but that the EU is somewhat more 
visible in public broadcasts and least visible in commercial television outlets (de Vreese et al, 
2006; Schuck et al, 2011). These variations across countries and outlets might of course affect 
the amount of information that reaches citizens. De Vreese & Boomgaarden (2006) find 
somewhat differing results that suggest there is more EU news on both public and commercial 
television than in broadsheet newspapers and tabloids, but they only study two countries and 
not all EU member states. But what is more important in their study is that they link media 
exposure to political participation, and find that watching more television news (both public 
and commercial) and reading the newspaper increased the propensity to vote in Denmark & 
the Nethelands (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006, p.330).   
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In addition to the amount of news some scholars have studied what kind of image is being 
transmitted and how it affects voting behaviour. Hobolt & Spoon (2012) could show that not 
only the politicisation of the EU issue in the media is important, but also the level of 
polarisation in opinions on EU issues amongst national parties. In some member states party 
positions on EU issues range from very negative to very positive, while in other countries the 
opinions expressed by parties are less divided. According to Schuck et al. (2011) media 
coverage of the EU increases if parties are polarised on EU issues. A high level of 
politicisation and party polarisation should therefore provide more information about party 
positions and increases the salience of EU issues to voters. Hobolt & Spoon (2012) argues 
that this makes the distance in opinion on the EU integration issue between a voter and their 
usually preferred party more important, which has a significant effect on the tendency to 
abstain or switch party in European Pariament elections. The increase is especially large in 
countries with negative media coverage of the EU (Hobolt & Spoon, 2012).  
Electoral laws and timing 
Previous research has shown that one of the strongest predictors of turnout is if a country has 
compulsory voting laws (Flickinger & Studlar, 2007; Wessels & Franklin, 2009; Marsh & 
Mikhaylov, 2010). There are two EU member states that actively enforce compulsory voting, 
Luxembourg and Belgium, and they are persistently at the top of the turnout league. Two 
others, Greece and Cyprus, have compulsory voting laws but there are no legal consequences 
for non-voters. Still, the laws can be seen to create a social norm of voting which enhances 
turnout (Rose, 2004, p.5). Belgium is of course also where most of the central EU institutions 
are located, and hosting an EU institution also gives a turnout boost (Marsh & Mikhaylov, 
2010). Another important factor for turnout is when the European Parliament election takes 
place in relation to the national election. If a European Parliament election is held shortly 
before a national general election it is often seen as an indicator of how parties will fare in the 
next national election, which raises interest both among voters and among politicians who are 
in the middle of a national election campaign and want to mobilise the public. If a national 
election was held recently turnout in the European election is lower (Flickinger & Studlar, 
2007; Wessels & Franklin, 2009; Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010). These contextual factors have 
mostly been studied in aggregate studies and are hard to control for in an individual level 
analysis. In an attempt to circumvent a part of this problem an additional regression is 
presented in the appendix where the countries using compulsory voting laws are excluded.  
 
14 
 
2.3 Individual factors  
 
Opinions and attitudes  
To begin with, citizens with an interest in politics have a higher propensity to vote. Söderlund 
et al (2011) compared the effect of interest in both European Parliament elections and national 
elections and found that interest in politics is even more crucial for turnout in European 
elections. They argue that this is because of the low salience of European Parliament 
elections. When an election is considered to be very important (like a national election) 
mobilisation efforts are greater, persuading even uninterested citizens to go vote, but in 
European elections mobilisation is much weaker and do not engage citizens with low interest 
in politics (Söderlund et al, 2011, p.691). Therefore, having a closer look on the determinants 
of turnout for politically uninterested citizens is important.  
Political trust in an institution can be described as by Grönlund & Setälä (2007, p.402): 
“institutional trust refers to the fulfilment of an individual´s normative expectations towards 
institutions”. In other words, if citizens have trust in institutions, they believe that they will do 
what is right and represent voters’ interests, which is important to give legitimacy to the 
representative character of most modern democracies. While a small amount of distrust can be 
healthy, to remind politicians of accountability, high levels of distrust for long periods of time 
can greatly damage the relationship between voters and their representatives (Nardis, 2015, 
p.47). Whether political trust affects turnout is somewhat debated, but recent research on the 
specific European Parliament context indicates that it does have an effect. Several authors 
have come to the conclusion that trust in the European Parliament is positively correlated with 
turnout in the European elections, using both aggregate and individual-level data (Cox, 2003, 
p.767; Nardis, 2015; Clark, 2014). It is important to separate this trust in institutions from 
trust in political actors. A voter may distrust a certain representative, but still have trust in the 
democratic system and its institutions, and might therefore be inclined to vote to see that 
particular representative replaced (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007, Nardis, 2015).  
Rose (2004, p.5) argues that not only trust in European institutions matter for turnout but trust 
in national institutions and actors might be even more important, since members of the 
European Parliament are nominated by national parties and elected in national elections. Rose 
measures trust in parties and trust in government and find the former to be more important 
than the latter, but he does however not include trust in national parliaments. Nardis (2015, 
p.59) finds that trust in national parliaments is equally important for turnout as trust in the 
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European Parliament, but that trust in the national government and the European Commission 
were not significant. This highlights the importance of separating trust in political institutions 
and political actors, and only trust in parliaments will be included in this study.  
Another disputed aspect is Euroscepticism, or EU support. Schmitt & van der Eijk (2007) 
argue that abstention is not a sign of Euroscepticism and in their study of the 1999 European 
elections they find no support for the theory that Euroscepticism influences turnout rates 
(Schmitt & van der Eijk, 2007). However, Hobolt & Spoon (2012, p.714) could show that an 
individual’s satisfaction with the EU does affect turnout, citizens who are dissatisfied with the 
EU are more likely to abstain from voting. Both Hobolt & Spoon (2012) and Hernández & 
Kriesi (2016) argue that it is reasonable to assume that the Eurosceptic sentiments are more 
important for voter behaviour in party systems where parties are divided on the issue of 
European integration. When voters are given real choices and their Eurosceptic attitudes are 
represented by one or several parties, it is possible that they choose to express their 
disapproval by voting for a Eurosceptic party rather than by not voting at all. But Hernández 
& Kriesi (2016) identify another important aspect that influences this connection, namely 
voters’ ideological opinions on the traditional left-right dimension. Only if there is a party that 
represents a citizen’s positions on both the EU and left-right dimensions, he or she is more 
likely to show their disapproval of the EU by voting instead of abstaining. This means that in 
member states where there are both right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic parties, the negative 
effect of Euroscepticism on turnout is smaller than in countries where there is limited 
politicisation of the EU issue or where Euroscepticism is biased towards only one end of the 
left-right political spectrum (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016).  
A turnout determinant that has not received much focus in the European Parliament context, 
but is often included as a control variable, is partisanship or party attachment. Feeling close to 
a specific party is likely to encourage voters to turn out to support their preferred party. For 
example, Schmitt (2005, p.658) finds party attachment to be the strongest predictor of 
electoral participation in the European elections.  
Bartkowska & Tiemann (2015, pp.206-207) show that economic perceptions can have an 
impact on turnout. Most importantly, they suggest that the mechanism differs between more 
or less politically knowledgeable and interested citizens. The authors argue that to cast an 
“economic vote” in the European elections an individual must have a rather extensive 
knowledge about the European institutions and their responsibilities, as well as be able to 
16 
 
distinguish between financial effects of national governmental actions, EU legislation and 
external shocks from the global market (Bartkowska & Tiemann, 2015, p.204). Someone who 
fits this description and who has negative perceptions of the economic developement can 
make an informed choice in the European elections based on financial preferences, but a 
dissatisfied individual who lacks interest or knowledge in economics is instead more likely to 
abstain from voting altogether (Bartkowska & Tiemann, 2015, p.207).  
Demographic aspects 
When it comes to age, middle aged citizens are more likely to vote than others (Bhatti & 
Hansen, 2012). Younger voters have not yet established a voting habit and are occupied with 
major changes in life, and older voters might not be as socially active and engaged in society 
as in their younger days. But in addition to age there is a generation effect that enhances the 
difference between younger and older voters, since generations born before the 60s vote in 
larger numbers than later generations (Bhatti & Hansen, 2012). 
Individuals with a higher education and income are also more likely to vote. According to the 
withdrawal hypothesis a person who is struggling to fulfil their basic needs will not prioritise 
voting over other activities that might improve their living conditions. In Fauvelle-Aymar & 
Stegmaiers (2008) aggregate study of the post-communist member states they found that this 
was only true for unemployment, which had a strong negative impact on turnout rates. Their 
other economic measures, GDP per capita and average regional GDP growth, had no effect on 
turnout (Fauvelle-Aymar & Stegmaier, 2008). 
 
2.4 The eastern paradox  
 
As has been described earlier, the post-communist member states have lower average turnout 
rates than the established EU-15 members. This does not apply to Cyprus and Malta; they 
joined the EU at the same time as many post-communist countries but can boast higher 
turnout rates in the European elections. There is of course variation; excluding Cyprus and 
Malta the 2014 turnout rates for the new member states range from 47% in Lithuania to 13% 
in Slovakia. Lithuania’s 47% is higher than for example Portugal, UK and the Netherlands 
which all have turnout rates between 30-40%. But the averages show a significant difference, 
the average turnout in the established EU-15 member states was 52% and the average for the 
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post-communist member states was only 29% (European Parliament, 2014). So there is 
obviously a regional difference.  
Recent research indicates that some explanation models for voting behaviour do not apply as 
well to citizens in the post-communist countries. To begin with, there is the issue of political 
trust. In most established EU-15 member states the average political trust in the European 
Parliament is lower than the trust in their national parliament. Citizens are likely more 
acquainted with their national institutions and trust them more than the distant European ones. 
But in the post-communist states this relationship is reversed. Citizens have more trust in the 
European Union than the national institutions, and there is quite a gap between these trust 
levels (Nardis, 2015). As Cox (2003, p.761) points out, political trust and participation suffer 
where “the state does not rule by law but by repression”, referencing the legacy of communist 
rule and the distrust and fear of national institutions that it generated.  
Clark (2014) argues that citizens judge supranational institutions, like the EU, by comparing 
them to their national counterparts. If a person lives in a country where they perceive the 
government and parliament to be responsive, representative and transparent it is very possible 
that they find the European institutions to be unresponsive and less democratic in comparison. 
But citizens in a country with weaker national institutions might not have as high expectations 
on the EU and perceive them as rather functional and responsive (Clark, 2014, pp.343-344). 
This would explain the very different levels of trust in the European Parliament compared to 
the national parliaments, but it still leaves questions about voting behaviour unanswered. In 
the end, Clark (2014) does find that perceptions of the European Parliament influences 
turnout, but fails to prove that this is affected by comparing the EU to national institutions. 
Some scholars have found that a high level of political trust in the European Parliament 
should affect turnout positively, but despite having the highest trust levels in the EU the post-
communist member states have very poor turnout rates. Rose (2004) suggests that it is 
precisely the low levels of trust in the national institutions that are responsible for the 
depressed turnout rates, which is partly supported by Nardis (2015) but has also been 
contradicted by Wessels & Franklin (2009).  
Nardis (2015) specifically look at political trust as a mediating factor and theorises that it is 
the character of news coverage that forms levels of political trust, which in turn affects 
turnout. More positive news about the EU fosters trust, while negatively framed news 
corrodes it. He finds support for this and in addition discovers that the link between news 
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coverage and political trust in the European Parliament is stronger in the eastern member 
states, which could partly explain the regional differences (Nardis, 2015). Research from the 
2004 elections show that there is less attention to the European Parliament elections in 
national media in the established EU-15 states than in the post-communist states. This means 
that the same level of news consumption equalled more exposure to EU news in the Central 
and East European states. The reporting was also more negative amongst the established 
members (de Vreese et al, 2006). But this regional pattern seems to have diminished by 2009. 
Schuck et al (2011) still find considerable variation in EU visibility among countries but it is 
harder to distinguish an east-west division. There is no research which covers how this has 
developed since then. But Hobolt & Spoon (2012) point out that party polarisation on EU 
issues is higher the west than in the east, which often leads to more negative coverage of the 
issue, and as mentioned in previous sections party polarisation can increase turnout and issue 
salience.  
Flickinger & Studlar (2007) studied many turnout factors on aggregate level and their results 
suggest that some national level concerns (such as trust in government and satisfaction with 
democracy) was more important in the new member states, but some EU-level concerns 
mattered more to citizens in established member states (Flickinger & Studlar, 2007, p.397).  
Schmitt (2005, p.668) suggests that party attachment is lower in the post-communist states, 
which contributes to higher party volatility. He also finds that political information, as 
measured by newspaper reading and political knowledge, is a stronger turnout predictor in the 
new post-communist than in the western member states (Schmitt, p.658). Regarding party 
choice, Koepke & Ringe (2006) found that the central second order behaviour of protest 
voting, i.e. signalling disapproval with the incumbent government by voting for an opposition 
party, is not nearly as common in the post-communist states as in the established member 
states. Voters in Central and East Europe tend to vote more sincerely. The second order model 
thus may not fit as well in the new member states (Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010).  
All the differences mentioned in this section indicate that there might be specific determinants 
of post-communist voting behaviour. This motivates the decision to test the regions separately 
in this study.  
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3. Hypotheses  
 
Voters who are politically interested are likely to already know something about the EU and 
are also more likely to independently search for information when deciding if and who to vote 
for. They might change their behaviour before the election and for example read more news 
articles than usual, and we already know from previous research that they are more likely to 
turn out to vote in European Parliament elections (Söderlund et al, 2011). But what about the 
not so politically interested? This study proposes to separate the politically uninterested from 
the rest of the eligible voters to study if more information can persuade them to vote in the 
European elections, even if they do not actively search for information out of interest. The 
politically uninterested account for a large part of the electorate and even though many are 
inclined to stay at home during an election some still turn out to vote. It is therefore important 
to get a better understanding of the determinants of turnout for this specific group.  
Citizens have different habits concerning their news media consumption, and will have 
different reasons for their choice. But the more an individual reads the newspaper and watches 
the news on TV, the more likely they are to be exposed to information about the European 
Parliament elections, even if they are not particularly interested in them. They can also 
become engaged in conversation about the elections with a more interested friend and acquire 
information from them. Research indicates that more information about the elections 
increases the probability that an individual chooses to cast a vote (Hogh & Vinaes Larsen, 
2016). If this is the case, turnout should be higher amongst citizens who are exposed to more 
information through media consumption or conversation. There is also some evidence 
pointing towards conversations being more influential than other sources of information in 
increasing voting (Schönbach & Lauf, 2002). In light of previous research, two hypotheses 
are formed and tested.   
H1: Individuals with low interest in politics are more likely to vote if exposed to more 
information about the European Parliament elections via television, newspapers, the Internet 
or personal conversations.  
H2: Such information is most efficient if conveyed through personal conversation rather than 
a media outlet.  
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The hypotheses will both be tested in all EU member states jointly and separately in the 
established EU-15 countries and the more recent eastern member states to see if the results 
differ between the regions. Malta and Cyprus are excluded from the group of new member 
states at this stage of the analysis, since they do not have the post-communist character that 
the others share and have significantly higher turnout rates.  
Information exposure for politically uninterested citizens has not yet been studied in the 
eastern member states, so there is no empirical evidence concerning information aspects that 
can provide a reason to assume that the effect of information on turnout is stronger in one 
region or another. But some other turnout predictors, including some of the control variables 
used in this study, seem to be working differently in the post-communist member states. Also, 
media environment differences might affect the results since three of the four information 
sources studied here are media outlets. Because of the lack of previous research on this 
specific topic no hypothesis is formed regarding which of the established or post-communist 
states would show a stronger information effect, but any regional differences will be observed 
in the analysis. 
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4. Method and material  
 
4.1 Logistic regression  
 
The aim of this study is to find general patterns in many countries, using large quantities of 
data. Therefore, it is suitable to use a form of statistical analysis to test the hypotheses. The 
research subject is turnout, which is a dichotomous variable. An individual either voted or did 
not vote. Because of this the method used will be logistic regression analysis. A linear 
regression would require the dependent variable to be a continuous scale, but that is not the 
case here (Djurfeldt & Barmark, 2009).  
A logistic regression, like any quantitative method, provides the opportunity to generalise the 
result. This is an important attribute since we want to be able to draw conclusions about the 
population voting behaviour across the EU and not only the sample that is tested. To achieve 
that, the sample needs to be randomly selected and representative of the population. This is 
virtually impossible using any kind of qualitative method. If a qualitative method was used, a 
stronger argument could have been made about the motivations behind voting behaviour and 
what aspects voters take into account when deciding to vote or not, but because of sample size 
and representation issues it would not be certain that this was applicable to any other voters 
than the ones interviewed or observed. With logistic regression analysis one can only test the 
strength of correlations and regression coefficients, but if significant results are found one can 
argue with greater confidence that they are generally applicable to the population.  
 
4.2 Data – EES 2014 
 
The hypotheses will be tested using data from the Voter Study of the 2014 European Election 
Survey (EES) (Schmitt, Hobolt, Popa & Teperoglou, 2014). The survey was conducted in all 
28 member states after the election during the period 30th of May - 27th of June 2014. The 
sample size in most countries was just over 1000 individuals, but in three countries with small 
populations (Malta, Cyprus & Luxembourg) only around 535 people were interviewed and in 
two large countries (Germany & United Kingdom) the sample size was closer to 1500. All the 
interviews were conducted face to face and in the relevant national language. This survey has 
been done since 1979 and is often used in research on European voting behaviour. The 
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advantages of using individual data when studying voting behaviour, as opposed to aggregate 
data, are the much larger sample size and the greater validity of the correlations. Even if a 
correlation between variables is found using aggregate data, there is no way to be certain that 
it is the same individuals that have reported high values on both variables (Hobolt & 
Wittrock, 2011, pp.29-30).  
Since the focus of this study is on politically uninterested citizens all others are filtered out 
from the data. In the questionnaire the statement “You are very interested in politics” can be 
responded to with the four alternatives “Yes, totally” and “Yes, somewhat”, “No, not really” 
and “No, not at all”2. All respondents who chose one of the two latter options are the base for 
the regressions, while the rest are excluded. It might be of importance to highlight that the 
uninterested account for more than half of all respondents, so the sample is large (15 260 
individuals out of a total of 30 064 respondents across the EU).  
As with all survey data there might be a risk of subjective answers. There might be translation 
issues or wordings that make respondents interpret questions in different ways, which render 
them harder to compare and analyse. There is also the trouble of respondents over-reporting. 
Even if they did not vote in the election, they may say they did. The self-reported turnout in 
the surveys is always higher than the actual turnout in the elections. Depending on who agrees 
to be interviewed, there may also be a problem with representation. There is a risk that for 
example elderly or politically interested citizens are overrepresented in the sample, since they 
might be the ones most likely to have the time and interest to participate in the study.  
 
4.3 Variables  
 
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable in this case is turnout in the European Parliament elections, and it is 
measured through the self-reported turnout in the survey. Respondents were asked “European 
Parliament elections were held on the (date of election). For one reason or another, some 
people in (country) did not vote in these elections. Did you yourself vote in the recent 
European Parliament elections?” 57,3 % of the respondents reported that they voted and 42,5 
% that they did not. Some said that they did not know, but they were few and their answers 
                                                          
2 A list of all variables used in this thesis can be found in Appendix 2, together with the exact question wording 
in the EES 2014 Voter Study.  
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will not be included in the analysis, making the variable dichotomous. The actual average 
turnout in the 2014 European Parliament elections was 42,6%, and to make sure that the over 
reporting in the survey does not skew my results, I include a weighting variable. The 
weighting variable also mitigates the impact of the fact that the survey sample is not 
completely representative of the population at large, and Popa et al. (2014) recommend that it 
is included in any analysis made with the EES 2014 data.  
Independent variables  
The independent variable is information exposure, including the different information sources 
TV, newspapers, the Internet and personal conversations. The survey question is:  
“How often did you do any of the following during the four weeks before the recent European 
elections. How often did you… 
1. Watch a programme about the European elections on television?  
2. Read about the European elections in a newspaper? 
3. Talk to friends or family about the European elections? 
5. Read about the European elections on the Internet (websites, social media, etc.)3  
The respondent is asked to pick one out of three alternatives that matches their habits for each 
information source, “Never” (1), “Sometimes” (2) or “Often” (3). Since the purpose of the 
study is to examine the effect of information in general on turnout, but also compare 
information sources, separate measures for each of the four sources will be included as 
independent variables. They are used as they are in the survey, trichotomous, by simply 
excluding the “don’t know” answers. These are of course not the only information sources 
that exist, but some of the most common ones. Including these four gives an insight into 
individual media habits and a general image of how exposed to information about the EU and 
the European elections they might be, even if they do not actively search for it out of interest. 
Using all three answers rather than just two allows for more variation in the results. There is 
however always a problematic issue with using ordinal variables in regressions since there is 
no way of guaranteeing that the space from one step to the next will be equal between all 
steps. How much more news about the EU does one have to watch to qualify into the “often” 
category instead of answering “sometimes”. This is rather subjective and will differ somewhat 
depending on the respondents’ judgement. But since the independent variables are the focus 
of the study it is important not to lose any of the variation in the results. There is an 
                                                          
3 Number 4 concerns attending a public meeting or rally about the European elections and is not included since 
it does not measure neither a media outlet nor personal communication.  
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alternative to using the ordinal variables as they are, which is dummy coding all the answer 
alternatives for each variable. Some might consider this a more precise coding, but here the 
ordinal variables are used because they are more easily presented and interpreted. For 
robustness, a version were the independent variables are dummy coded is presented in the 
appendix where readers can see that both coding options produce very similar results. This 
ensures that the use of ordinal variables has not distorted the results of this study.  
Control variables 
To be sure that the potential correlations that are found are really the effect of the independent 
variable and not of other factors, a number of control variables are included. In line with 
previous research some are attitudinal variables, while others are of a demographic character.  
Political trust in the European Parliament has previously been shown to affect turnout (Nardis, 
2015; Cox, 2003) Trust is measured in the survey by the interviewer making the statement 
“You trust the institutions of the EU” and the respondent answering what alternative that 
corresponds with his or her opinion out of four alternatives. This is recoded so that the 
alternatives “Yes, totally” and “Yes, somewhat” are combined and the alternative “No, not 
really” is put together with “No, not at all” to form a dichotomous variable that signals a high 
(1) or low (0) level of trust in the EU. By separating the alternatives into only two groups the 
above mentioned problem with guaranteeing equal steps in ordinal variables is avoided, since 
there is only one step between 0 and 1.  
Political trust in the national parliament is not as thoroughly researched as trust in the 
European parliament, but Rose’s (2004) findings imply that it is especially important for 
turnout in the post-communist countries. The variable is measured in the same way as trust in 
the European parliament, namely by the statement “You trust the national parliament (use 
proper name for lower house)” and four alternative answers ranging from “Yes, totally” to 
“No, not at all”. The coding is identical to the one for trust in the European parliament, 
making it a dichotomous variable.  
Euroscepticism is also a much debated factor. Hernandez & Kriesi (2016) have shown that 
some of the disagreement might originate from a previous failure to identify certain 
contextual aspects that modify the effect of Euroscepticism on turnout. But in some cases it 
seems to have an impact, so it is therefore included. To measure Euroscepticism the following 
survey question is used: “Generally speaking, do you think that our country’s membership of 
the EU is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good thing nor a bad thing?” To capture the 
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most strongly felt disapproval of the EU and to make the variable dichotomous, the answer “A 
bad thing” (1) is separated from the other two which are combined to show a positive or 
neutral position (0). A negative effect is expected for this variable.  
Many scholars suggest that parties have a great impact on citizens’ propensity to turn out and 
vote. The intricacies of party systems are not closely examined here, but a control variable 
measuring partisanship will be included. If an individual feels closer to or is a member of a 
certain party, he or she is more likely to develop a voting habit and turn out to support their 
preferred party in all elections (Schmitt, 2005). In the EES survey respondents are asked “Do 
you consider yourself to be close to any particular political party?”. Everyone who answered 
that they did were also asked to name the party they preferred, but that is not of interest to this 
study. All respondents who answered “Yes” are therefore coded into one group (1), and all 
who answered “No” into another (0), forming a dichotomous variable.  
Bartkowska & Tiemann (2015) show that negative perceptions about the economic situation 
lead to different reactions from politically interested citizens and the politically uninterested, 
where the former are more likely to make an informed party choice to impact the future 
economic development and the latter are likely to abstain. Since this study examined the 
voting behaviour of specifically politically uninterested citizens, economic perceptions are 
included as a control variable by measuring their thoughts on the future economic 
development in their country. The survey question is “What do you think about the economy? 
Over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in (country) will 
be?” and the answers available are “get a lot better”, “get a little better”, “stay the same”, “get 
a little worse”, “get a lot worse”. The last two options are coded to mean a negative view (1) 
and the rest are grouped together to signal a positive or neutral view (0) of the economy. A 
negative effect is expected.  
Age has been proven to have a strong connection to turnout rates, and the recurring pattern is 
that middle aged voters turn out in greater numbers than younger and older citizens. There is 
also a generation effect which show that in the generations born before the 60’s a larger share 
of citizens turn up at the poll than in the younger generations (Bhatti & Hansen, 2012). 
Therefore it is important to control for age, and the variable used is the simple question “How 
old are you?” Since the answers make up a scale variable it could be used at it is, but to adapt 
the data to the idea of the active middle aged voter the respondents are grouped into 3 age 
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cohorts (young, middle aged and old) where the group consisting of 45-64 (middle aged) year 
olds is used as a reference category.  
Highly educated citizens are more likely to vote than others, in both national and European 
elections, and education should thus be introduced as a control variable. However the design 
of the only variable available in the EES 2014 data is not optimal for the needs of this study. 
Instead of asking the respondent how many years of full time education they have completed, 
the question is “How old were you when you stopped full-time education?” The alternative 
“20+” will be coded as high education (1) and the remaining alternatives combined as low 
education (0), including the alternative “Still studying”. There is a risk that this is misleading, 
since some of the respondents who answered “Still studying” might be going through a higher 
university education that is still not completed, but will still fall into the category low 
education due to the choice of coding. However, the share of respondents who chose this 
alternative is quite small so even if some individuals will be coded into the wrong category it 
will not have too great an impact on the results. There is also a possibility that some who 
report an old age for quitting full-time education did not actually study at university level, but 
were rather completing missing grades from secondary school or high school later in life. But 
this is the only education variable available, so it will have to suffice despite its shortcomings.   
According to the withdrawal hypothesis, an individual who is struggling to make ends meet 
will not prioritise voting over activities that might improve their living standards (Fauvelle-
Aymar & Stegmaier, 2008). For example, someone who is unemployed will probably think 
that their time is better spent looking for work than travelling to a polling station. Therefore, 
an unemployment variable is included and is measured by the survey question “What is your 
current occupation?”. The respondents who answered “Unemployed” (1) are separated from 
the rest who are either employed, retired or studying (0). A negative effect is expected from 
this variable.  
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5. Results  
 
Firstly the independent variables are tested without any control variables in Model 1 and then 
all the control variables are added in Model 2.  
5.1 Model 1  
 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, information received through television, newspaper or personal 
conversations have a significant effect on turnout, supporting hypothesis 1, but the Internet 
does not. To see how great the effects are it is recommended to look at the odds ratios 
presented in the table, since the B-coefficients are not as easily interpreted as in an OLS 
regression. The odds ratio shows the percentual change in the odds (probability) that the 
phenomenon measured in the dependent variable will occur (in this case voting), when the 
independent or control variable of interest is increased by one step. An odds ratio of 1 means 
that the dependent variable is not affected, while a value lower than 1 means the odds are 
decreased and a value higher than 1 means that the odds are increased (Djurfeldt & Barmark, 
2009). For example an odds ratio of 1,304 for newspapers shows that the odds for a person 
casting a vote in the European Parliament elections is increased by 30,4% if their reported 
newspaper reading about the elections increases from “Never” to “Sometimes”. 
In the western countries, and in the EU over all, conversations seem to be the source of 
information that is most likely to persuade a politically uninterested person to turn out to vote. 
This is in line with hypothesis 2. The odds ratio for conversations is just shy of 2 in EU-15 
countries which indicates that an advancement of one step on the ordinal scale for 
conversations almost doubles the odds that an individual casts a vote. It appears that people 
are more inclined to listen to what a friend or family member says than what someone they 
don’t know personally says on the TV or in the newspaper. Television is the second most 
effective. But in the post-communist countries television is the strongest predictor, even 
though conversations are still important. Earlier research from the 2004 election showed that 
there were more EU news on television in the more recent member states, which might be a 
reason for the higher importance of television in that region (de Vreese et al, 2006). But later 
research has not been able to confirm the continuation of this pattern and there is no media 
study from 2014 available, so that is only speculation. Newspaper is significant, but weaker 
than both conversations and television in all regions.  
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Pseudo R2 Nagelkerkes is 0,21 and 0,23  for the EU-15 and post-communist states 
respectively. Unlike R2 in OLS regressions, Nagelkerkes R2 cannot be said to represent the 
percentage of explained variance. But it can still be used to compare the strength of different 
models, so the results suggest that the information aspects have a slightly larger impact in 
post-communist states than in the western established member states (Djurfeldt & Barmark, 
2009).  
Table 5.1. Model 1 - Independent variables 
Model 1 EU-28 EU-15 Post-communist 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Television 0,459*** 1,583 0,494*** 1,639 0,690*** 1,994 
Newspaper 0,265*** 1,304 0,108* 1,114 0,139** 1,149 
Internet 0,031 1,032 0,108* 1,114 0,036 1,037 
Conversation 0,564*** 1,757 0,641*** 1,898 0,541*** 1,717 
 
Intercept -2,117 -1,488 -2,512 
Nagelkerkes R2 0,152 0,214 0,229 
n 
14 830 
(missing: 2,8%) 
7 505 
(missing: 2,2%) 
6 793 
(missing: 3,6%) 
Significance levels: *= p < 0,05, **= p < 0,01, ***= p < 0,001 
Source: EES Voter Study 2014, GESIS data archive.  
Dependent variable: turnout. Weight: wexpol.  
 
5.2 Model 2 
 
Next, the control variables are included to see what effect they have on this explanation. The 
rates of missing answers goes from around 3% in Table 5.1 to around 30% in Table 5.2, but 
that is because only the respondents who answered all of the questions used as variables are 
included. Any that answered “don’t know” or refused to answer any question are removed 
from the analysis. Nagelkerkes pseudo R2 is higher in all three regressions, and scores the 
highest number in the post-communist region with 0,315. Here the gap to the 0,259 for EU-15 
is more pronounced than in the previous model, which indicates that this set of variables is 
more effective in explaining turnout rates in post-communist countries than in the western 
member states, and that some of the difference can be found in a few of the added control 
variables. A quick look at Table 5.2 suggest that it is primarily the two variables trust in the 
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European Parliament and the dummy for older voters that are responsible for the better model 
fit in the Central and East European states.   
Conversation is now the strongest of the independent variables in all regions. The coefficients 
and odds ratios for personal conversations are surprisingly stable as the control variables are 
included. Television is still significant at the highest level in all regions, but the effect has 
decreased somewhat after the inclusion of control variables, most notably in the post-
communist countries. Newspapers are no longer significant in the regional regressions, but 
still are when including all countries. The effect of getting information on the Internet has 
increased somewhat compared to the first model and is now significant in all regions. But 
overall, the effects of conversation and television are superior to both newspapers and the 
Internet.   
Moving on to the control variables, it is apparent that political trust in the EU does influence 
turnout and it is interesting to see that the effect is much larger in the post-communist 
countries. In that region citizens with high political trust in the EU are twice as likely to vote 
as those who distrust the European institutions. The effect of political trust in the national 
parliament is less impressive, but still significant. Euroscepticism has a slight negative effect 
on turnout. The effect is about the same in both regions, but it is statistically significant at the 
highest level in EU-15 and only at the lowest in the eastern member states. It is however not 
statistically significant when analysing all of the member states together. As described earlier, 
the effect of Euroscepticism is dependent on the party system context (Hernández & Kriesi, 
2016). No measure for party system is included in this analysis, which might explain the 
somewhat irregular pattern here.  
Partisanship is the strongest determinant for turnout of all the ones included in this study. 
Apparently the mobilising effect of feeling close to a party is almost equally important in all 
of Europe and it doubles the odds for citizens to cast a vote compared to those who do not 
have a preferred party to support. Regarding negative economic perceptions, they do not seem 
to have any significant effect, contradicting Bartkowska & Tiemann’s (2015) results which 
indicated that they generate lower turnout among the politically uninterested. When it comes 
to age it obviously influences turnout, but the generational effects described by Bhatti & 
Hansen (2012) might be even stronger. Younger citizens are less likely to vote all across 
Europe, but it seems as though the elderly are even more likely to vote than the middle aged. 
In EU-15 there seem to be no significant difference at all between the middle aged and the  
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Table 5.2. Model 2 – Independent and control variables 
Model 2 EU-28 EU-15 Post-communist 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Television 0,325*** 1,384 0,381*** 1,463 0,528*** 1,696 
Newspaper 0,118** 1,126 0,010 1,011 -0,031 0,969 
Internet 0,118** 1,126 0,125* 1,133 0,145* 1,157 
Conversation  0,562*** 1,754 0,595*** 1,814 0,558*** 1,747 
 
Political trust in EU  0,417*** 1,517 0,413*** 1,512 0,801*** 2,227 
Political trust in NP 0,312*** 1,366 -0,108 0,898 0,196* 1,217 
Euroscepticism -0,019 0,982 -0,253*** 0,777 -0,243* 0,784 
Partisanship 0,790*** 2,204 0,863*** 2,370 0,861*** 2,365 
Economic 
perceptions 
0,087 1,091 0,093 1,097 0,055 1,057 
Dummy young (18-
45) 
-0,418*** 0,659 -0,469*** 0,626 -0,225** 0,798 
Dummy old (65+) 0,229*** 1,258 -0,075 0,928 0,375*** 1,455 
Education 0,188*** 1,207 0,025 1,025 0,196* 1,217 
Unemployment -0,097 0,908 -0,294** 0,745 0,042 1,043 
 
Intercept  -2,471 -1,421 -3,062 
Nagelkerkes R2 0,223 0,259 0,315 
n  
10 575 
(missing: 30,7%) 
5 451 
(missing: 29%) 
4 804 
(missing: 31,8%) 
Significance levels: *= p < 0,05, **= p < 0,01, ***= p < 0,001 
Source: EES Voter Study 2014, GESIS data archive.  
Dependent variable: turnout. Weight: wexpol 
 
elderly. This result should however be interpreted with caution, since it might be affected by 
the choice of coding. The age cohort 45-64 was coded as middle aged, but the results might 
look differently if another age span was chosen. Education has the expected positive effect in 
all member states, but it is rather weak and even more so in EU-15 where it is not even 
significant. Unemployment is only significant in EU-15 and not in the post-communist 
member states. This is surprising since Fauvelle-Aymar & Stegmaier (2008) found strong 
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support for the connection between unemployment and turnout in specifically the post-
communist countries.  
It is not possible to control for country-level variables, such as compulsory voting, in this 
analysis but for robustness an additional model is presented in the appendix, where the 
countries that implemented compulsory voting laws at the time of the 2014 European 
elections are excluded. The results show that when the compulsory voting factor is removed 
the effect of many other variables increase, indicating that compulsory voting is an important 
determinant in countries that implement it which suppresses the effect of other factors. But it 
is not possible to know precisely how big the effect is.  
To connect these results to the hypotheses it is now possible to confirm that support is found 
for both hypothesis 1 and 2. Exposure to more information about the EU and the European 
elections does increase the propensity to vote in European Parliament elections for citizens 
with low interest in politics. But this is conditioned by the source of information; while 
television and personal conversations seem to be able to persuade citizens to participate in 
elections, the Internet and newspapers are less effective.  
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6. Discussion 
 
This thesis has been able to show that exposure to more information about the EU and the 
European elections can persuade politically uninterested citizens to go vote. But it has also 
become apparent that not only the amount of information that reaches citizens is important, 
but also the source of it. Personal conversation was the most important factor for turnout in 
this study, and the effect stayed strong even when introducing control variables. This indicates 
that people are more inclined to listen to a friend or family member than the media; 
interpersonal communication and social accountability provides greater incentives to vote 
than information from media outlets. It also gives credibility to Schönbach & Laufs (2002) 
argument that a conversation is not as easily avoided as skipping certain media content, even 
when one does not find the subject interesting. This suggests that if the goal is to boost 
turnout in a European election, electoral campaigns might be more effective if directed 
towards the politically interested with a message of encouraging their friends to vote.  
An interesting finding is the relatively weak effect of the Internet. Political communication is 
increasingly transferred to the online sphere and parties and other political actors are learning 
how to use social media to reach voters. The Internet is also where many actors engage in 
opinion formation and where propaganda is spread, so a greater impact of online information 
could be expected. But it might be that citizens are sceptical of messages received online, if 
the awareness of distribution of false information and manipulated photos and videos is 
increasing. Another reason could be that it is easier to customise your media consumption 
online and that people who are not interested in politics simply do not visit or follow sites that 
provide political content. But this is just speculation, and future research could further explore 
the reasons behind the weak effect shown here. 
Another possible subject for future research is to view parties as an information source and of 
themselves. Even if their message is often conveyed through the media, politicians also hold 
public meetings and debates, and some electoral campaigns involve approaching potential 
voters in the street or over the phone. The magnitude of these activities is likely weaker 
during European than national elections (except if they are held shortly after each other), but 
it could still be included as an additional information source in future studies.  
The results show regional differences in some variables, but most are relatively small. The 
control variable that stands out is political trust in the EU, which is more important for turnout 
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in the post-communist member states. But this is not a new finding, it only confirms 
indications from previous research. The contribution here is the results on information 
sources, where it is clear that television has a greater impact on turnout in the east than in the 
west. To get a better understanding of why this is the case, a media study for the 2014 election 
should be made since data on media content, EU visibility in different media outlets and tone 
of the coverage is not available at the time of writing. It might be that contextual factors like 
media environment or party systems can explain some of this difference. Since many of the 
control variables in this study seem to have similar effects in both EU-15 and post-communist 
states it could also be that contextual factors would be better in explaining the lower turnout 
rates in the second region, than the individual factors studied here.  
Contextual factors are obviously important for turnout, but in this individual-centered study it 
is hard to properly control for that dimension. Attempts were made to check the robustness of 
the findings by excluding or comparing certain countries that are known to be affected by 
contextual variation according to previous research, but it is not possible to precisely measure 
these effects here. Future researchers would gain from using a multi-level approach and 
connect the individual-level determinants explored here with the country-level variables 
identified by previous research. This would help to get an overview of all the known turnout 
determinants and how they are interrelated.  
In conclusion, this thesis has contributed to the existing literature by studying the effects of 
information exposure in the post-communist states where it was not previously explored, and 
updating the information research on the EU-15 member states. The importance of studying 
politically uninterested citizens has also been highlighted, and this can hopefully be developed 
further in future work. Personal conversations have proven to be the most effective 
information source for turnout of the four studied here, which confirms the importance to 
include it alongside media information. But this field of research will hopefully expand to 
explore the mechanisms behind these results more closely, bringing in for example 
interpersonal trust and the role of parties in media. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1. Turnout European Parliament Elections 2014  
The turnout rates for the 2014 European Parliament elections by country. Presented in order 
of accession.  
Country Turnout 
Belgium  89,64% 
Luxembourg 85,55% 
Netherlands  37,32%  
Germany 48,10% 
France 42,43% 
Italy  57,22% 
Denmark 56,32% 
United Kingdom  35,60% 
Ireland 52,44% 
Greece  59,97% 
Spain  43,81% 
Portugal 33,67% 
Sweden  51,07% 
Finland 39,10% 
Austria 45,39% 
Estonia 36,52% 
Latvia  30,24% 
Lithuania  47,35% 
Czech Republic  18,20% 
Poland  23,83% 
Hungary 28,97% 
Slovenia 24,55% 
Slovakia 13,05% 
Malta  74,80% 
Cyprus  43,97% 
Romania 32,44% 
Bulgaria 35,84% 
Croatia 25,24% 
Source: European Parliament  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html. 
 
Appendix 2. Variables from EES 2014 used in the thesis  
Variables in thesis Variable from EES 2014 Question wording 
Political interest 
Yes=1 
No=0 
QP6_9 
You are very interested in politics 
/QP6- For each of the following 
statements, please tell me to what 
extent it corresponds or not to 
your attitude or opinion. 
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Turnout 
Yes=1 
No=0 
QP1 
European Parliament elections 
were held on the (insert correct 
date according to country). For 
one reason or another, some 
people in (our country) did not 
vote in these elections. Did you 
yourself vote in the recent 
European Parliament elections? 
Television information 
Never=1 
Sometimes=2 
Often=3 
QP11_1 
Watch a programme about the 
European elections on television. 
/QP11- How often did you do any 
of the following during the four 
weeks before the recent European 
elections? How often did you…? 
Newspaper information QP11_2 
Read about the European elections 
in a newspaper. /QP11 
Internet information QP11_5 
Read about the European elections 
on the Internet (websites, social 
media, etc.) /QP11 
Conversation information QP11_3 
Talk to friends or family about the 
European elections. /QP11 
Political trust in EU  
Yes=1 
No=0 
QP6_2 
You trust the institutions of the 
EU /QP6 
Political trust in NP 
Yes=1 
No=0 
QPP9_1 
You trust the (Nationality 
parliament) /QPP9-For each of the 
following statements, please tell 
me to what extent it corresponds 
or not to your attitude or opinion. 
Euroscepticism 
Bad=1 
Good or neutral=0 
QP7 
Generallt speaking, do you think 
that (our country)’s membership 
of the EU is…? 
Partisanship 
Feeling close to a party=1 
Not close=0 
QPP21 
Do you consider yourself to be 
close to any particular political 
party? 
Economic perceptions  
Worse=1 
Better=0 
QPP16 
What do you think about the 
economy? Over the next 12 
months, how do you think the 
general economic situation in (our 
country) will be? 
Age  
18-44=Young 
45-64=Middle aged 
65+=Old 
D11 (d11r2) How old are you? 
Education 
High education=1 
Low education=0 
D8 
How old were you when you 
stopped full-time education? 
Unemployment 
Unemployed=1 
Occupation=0 
C14 What is your current occupation? 
Source: EES 2014 Voter Study, Master Questionnaire.  
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Appendix 3. Alternative coding for the independent variables. 
The independent variables are here dummy coded and the answer “Never” is used as 
reference category. Only results for EU-28 are shown here, since the point is simply to show 
that the results are very similar when using this coding option instead of the one used in the 
study. Compare this table to the first column of Table 5.2 above.  
 
Model 2  
Alternative coding 
EU-28 
 B Exp(B) 
Television sometimes 0,424*** 1,529 
Television often 0,509*** 1,663 
Newspaper sometimes 0,039 1,040 
Newspaper often 0,410*** 1,506 
Internet sometimes  0,076 1,078 
Internet often 0,345*** 1,412 
Conversation sometimes 0,636*** 1,889 
Conversation often 0,952*** 2,591 
 
Political trust in EU  0,413*** 1,511 
Political trust in NP 0,313*** 1,368 
Euroscepticism -0,010 0,990 
Partisanship 0,798*** 2,221 
Economic perceptions 0,088 1,092 
Dummy young (18-45) -0,411*** 0,663 
Dummy old (65+) 0,229*** 1,257 
Education 0,190*** 1,209 
Unemployment -0,092 0,912 
 
Intercept  -1,393 
Nagelkerkes R2 0,225 
n  
10 575 (missing: 
30,7%) 
Significance levels: *= p < 0,05, **= p < 0,01, ***= p < 0,001 
Source: EES Voter Study 2014, GESIS data archive. Weight: wexpol.  
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Appendix 4. Compulsory voting  
Since the study is made with individual-level data it is not possible to control for the effect of 
compulsory voting in the regression. But several authors have found such electoral laws to 
have a great impact on turnout. Therefore, a regression is presented here where the four EU 
member states having compulsory voting laws in place at the time of the 2014 European 
election (Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Cyprus) are excluded from the analysis to see if 
it changes the results in any significant way.  
Model 2 EU-28 
Excluding 
compulsory voting 
countries 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Television 0,325*** 1,384 0,355*** 1,427 
Newspaper 0,118** 1,126 0,157*** 1,170 
Internet 0,118** 1,126 0,136** 1,146 
Conversation  0,562*** 1,754 0,591*** 1,806 
 
Political trust in EU  0,417*** 1,517 0,504*** 1,655 
Political trust in NP 0,312*** 1,366 0,257*** 1,292 
Euroscepticism -0,019 0,982 -0,026 0,974 
Partisanship 0,790*** 2,204 0,765*** 2,148 
Economic perceptions 0,087 1,091 -0,021 0,979 
Dummy young (18-45) -0,418*** 0,659 -0,476*** 0,621 
Dummy old (65+) 0,229*** 1,258 0,287*** 1,333 
Education 0,188*** 1,207 0,126** 1,134 
Unemployment -0,097 0,908 -0,031 0,969 
 
Intercept  -2,471 -2,811 
Nagelkerkes R2 0,223 0,232 
n  
10 575 
(missing: 30,7%) 
9 334 
(missing: 31,2%) 
Significance levels: *= p < 0,05, **= p < 0,01, ***= p < 0,001 
Source: EES Voter Study 2014, GESIS data archive. Weight: wexpol.  
As can be seen above some slight differences are visible. The significance of the variables 
does not change but the effect increases for several of them. This indicates that compulsory 
voting laws is an important explanatory factor for turnout in the countries that implement 
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them. Trust in national parliaments is one of few variables that decrease when excluding 
compulsory voting, which might suggest that compulsory voting is one of the factors that 
connect trust in parliament to turnout. But in this individual-level study it is not possible to 
know precisely how big the effect is. 
 
Appendix 5. Malta & Cyprus 
To see what effect the choice to exclude Malta and Cyprus from the group of new member 
states had on the results, a table is presented here comparing the results with and without the 
two countries. As can be seen below the results are quite similar. The samples from both 
Malta and Cyprus are small, so even if some mechanisms are different in those countries, a 
great impact on the results is not expected.  
Model 2 
All 10 new member 
states 
Only post-
communist 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Television 0,496*** 1,643 0,528*** 1,696 
Newspaper -0,042 0,959 -0,031 0,969 
Internet 0,138* 1,148 0,145* 1,157 
Conversation  0,565*** 1,760 0,558*** 1,747 
 
Political trust in EU  0,776*** 2,173 0,801*** 2,227 
Political trust in NP 0,278*** 1,320 0,196* 1,217 
Euroscepticism -0,152 0,859 -0,243* 0,784 
Partisanship 0,812*** 2,253 0,861*** 2,365 
Economic perceptions 0,013 1,013 0,055 1,057 
Dummy young (18-45) -0,251** 0,778 -0,225** 0,798 
Dummy old (65+) 0,356*** 1,427 0,375*** 1,455 
Education 0,214** 1,239 0,196* 1,217 
Unemployment -0,046 0,955 0,042 1,043 
 
Intercept  -2,900 -3,062 
Nagelkerkes R2 0,319 0,315 
n  
5 124 
(missing: 32,5%) 
4 804 
(missing: 31,8%) 
Significance levels: *= p < 0,05, **= p < 0,01, ***= p < 0,001 
Source: EES Voter Study 2014, GESIS data archive. Weight: wexpol.  
